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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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DIST 29 OCTOBER 1973

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1. [redacted] 1.5 (c)

2. THERE ARE TWO CURRENTS IN THE ARMY REGARDING HOW TO DEAL WITH EXTREMISTS. THE HARD-LINERS BELIEVE THAT EXTREMISTS OR MARXIST ACTIVISTS SHOULD BE SUMMARILY EXECUTED, WHILE THE

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SOFT-LINERS BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE TRIED, SENTENCED AND AN ATTEMPT ME MADE TO RE-EDUCATE THEM. THE HARD-LINE GENERALS ARE LED SY AUGUSTO P I N O C H E T, PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA, AND SERGIO A R E L L A N O, COMMANDER OF ARMY TROOPS. THE SOFT-LINERS INCLUDE GENERAL OSCAR B O N I L L A, MINISTER OF INTERIOR; JOAQUIN L A G O S, COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ARMY DIVISION IN ANTOFAGASTA; HECTOR B R A V O, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY CALVARY DIVISION; AND WASHINGTON C A R R A S C O, COMMANDER OF THE THIRD ARMY DIVISION IN CONCEPCION.

3. WHILE CARRASCO FAVORED THE COUP, HE HAS REFUSED TO EXECUTE EXTREMISTS AND HAS EVEN HELD CONVERSATIONS WITH SUPPORTERS OF THE OUSTED POPULAR UNITY (U.P.) GOVERNMENT IN THE AREA OF CONCEPCION. LAGOS HAS ACTED IN A LIKE MANNER IN HIS AREA. BECAUSE OF THEIR ATTITUDE, ARELLANO MET WITH BOTH GENERALS AND WARNED THEM TO TAKE THE ANTI-SUBVERSION CAMPAIGN SERIOUSLY.

4. MAJORITY OF THE JUNIOR OFFICERS IN THE ARMY SUPPORT THE HARD-LINE POSITION. IN ADDITION, THE HARD-LINE ATTITUDE IS HELD IN GENERAL AMONG THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE.

5. [redacted] 1.5 (c)

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1.5 (c)

6. IN LATE OCTOBER 1973, GENERAL SERGIO N U N O, PRESIDENT OF THE CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CORFO), IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A SOFT-LINER WITH REGARD TO SOME OF THE HARD-HANDED MEASURES AGAINST ALLEGED SUBVERSIVES WHICH HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT SINCE THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP. NUNO PLACED GENERAL B O N I L L A IN THE SAME CATEGORY AND IDENTIFIED P I N O C H E T AND AIR FORCE GENERAL GUSTAVO L E I G H, JUNTA MEMBERS, AS BEING HARD LINERS.

7. NUNO SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE EXECUTION OF SUCH PERSONS AS CARLOS A L T A M I R A N O, HEAD OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY WHO IS ON THE LIST OF THE 10- MOST -WANTED MEN IN THE FORMER POPULAR UNITY (U.P.) GOVERNMENT; BUT THAT HE DID OPPOSE INSTANCES WHERE WORKERS AND/OR LABOR LEADERS IN A GIVEN FACTORY HAD BEEN ACCUSED AND SUMMARILY EXECUTED WITHOUT A PROPER TRIAL, AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS KIND OF EXCESS, NUNO CITED THE CASE OF 11 WORKERS AND ONE LABOR LEADER IN THE EXPLOSIVES

FACTORY IN ANTOFAGASTA, WHERE NUNO WAS THE FORMER DIRECTOR. NUNO SAID THAT THE MEN WERE EXECUTED BECAUSE THEY WERE FOUND TO HAVE IN THEIR POSSESSION A PLAN OF THE FACTORY ALONG WITH SOME EXPLOSIVES AND SOME DOCUMENTS CONNECTING THEM WITH EXTREMIST GROUPS.

8. NUNO SAID HE BROUGHT THE LATTER CASE BEFORE THE 20 OCTOBER MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AS AN EXAMPLE OF UNNECESSARY REPRESSION AND ALIENATION OF THE LABORING CLASS. HE SAID THAT WHILE HIS POSITION WAS SUPPORTED BY BONILLA, GENERALS PINOCHET AND LEIGH SPOKE OUT STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF THE NEED FOR SUCH STRONG ACTION.

9. [redacted] 1.5 (c)